Now UCC Me, Now You Don\u27t: The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Ignores the UCC in Requiring Unity of Note and Mortgage for Foreclosure in \u3cem\u3eEaton v. Fannie Mae\u3c/em\u3e by Cifrino, Christopher
Boston College Law Review
Volume 54
Issue 6 Electronic Supplement Article 9
4-10-2013
Now UCC Me, Now You Don't: The
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Ignores the
UCC in Requiring Unity of Note and Mortgage for
Foreclosure in Eaton v. Fannie Mae
Christopher Cifrino
Boston College Law School, christopher.cifrino@bc.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr
Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons, Commercial Law Commons, Housing Law
Commons, Property Law and Real Estate Commons, and the State and Local Government Law
Commons
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more
information, please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Christopher Cifrino, Now UCC Me, Now You Don't: The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Ignores the UCC in Requiring Unity of Note
and Mortgage for Foreclosure in Eaton v. Fannie Mae, 54 B.C.L. Rev. E. Supp. 99 (2013), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol54/
iss6/9
99 
NOW UCC ME, NOW YOU DON’T:  
THE MASSACHUSETTS SUPREME JUDICIAL 
COURT IGNORES THE UCC IN REQUIRING 
UNITY OF NOTE AND MORTGAGE FOR 
FORECLOSURE IN EATON v. FANNIE MAE 
Abstract: On June 22, 2012, in Eaton v. Federal National Mortgage Associa-
tion, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts upheld a trial court 
ruling and held that an entity must hold both note and mortgage in or-
der to foreclose properly. Because this represented a significant shift in 
Massachusetts foreclosure law, the court applied its ruling only prospec-
tively. To support its holding, the court relied on common law and stat-
utory justifications. In so doing, the court did not address pertinent sec-
tions of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) that could have led to 
the same outcome. This Comment argues that examining the UCC in 
the context of mortgage and foreclosure cases could lend clarity to an 
outmoded and inconsistent area of the law. 
Introduction 
 Although foreclosure filings have declined somewhat since their 
peak in 2010, the numbers remain at historically high levels across the 
nation.1 Massachusetts is no exception.2 The increase in foreclosures 
                                                                                                                      
1 See 1 Million Properties with Foreclosure Filings in First Half of 2012, RealtyTrac ( July 10, 
2012), http://www.realtytrac.com/content/foreclosure-market-report/midyear-2012-us-fore 
closure-market-report-7291 (showing over 1 million properties with foreclosure filings in the 
first half of 2012); 2011 Year-End Foreclosure Report: Foreclosures on the Retreat, RealtyTrac (Jan. 
9, 2012), http://www.realtytrac.com/content/foreclosure-market-report/2011-year-end-fore 
closure-market-report-6984 (showing over 1.8 million properties in foreclosure in 2011) 
[hereinafter 2011 Foreclosure Report]; Record 2.9 Million U.S. Properties Receive Foreclosure Filings 
in 2010, RealtyTrac ( Jan. 12, 2011), http://www.realtytrac.com/content/press-releases/ 
record-29-million-us-properties-receive-foreclosure-filings-in-2010-despite-30-month-low-in-
december-6309 (showing nearly 2.9 million properties in foreclosure in 2010). In 2010, 
4.6% of mortgage loans were in foreclosure, compared to 1.0% in 2005, 1.2% in 2000, and 
0.9% in 1990. U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the U.S.: 2012, at tbl.1194 
(2012), available at http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s1194.pdf. 
Furthermore, in light of the ever-shifting regulatory landscape, the decrease in foreclo-
sures may be attributable mainly to caution on the part of lenders; in other words, the 
decrease may be indicative of a delay in foreclosures rather than a recovery. See 2011 Fore-
closure Report, supra (“Foreclosures were in full delay mode in 2011 . . . .” (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)). 
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has led to a commensurate increase in foreclosure-related litigation.3 
In Massachusetts in 2010, homeowner Henrietta Eaton refused to 
leave her foreclosed-upon home and, in court to fight eviction, coun-
terclaimed that the foreclosure on her property was improper.4 The 
trial court agreed and held that the foreclosing party had not proven 
the requisite ownership of both note and mortgage.5 This was signifi-
cant because, previously in Massachusetts, the foreclosing party typi-
cally foreclosed with only the mortgage.6 On appeal in June 2012, in 
Eaton v. Federal National Mortgage Association, the Massachusetts Su-
preme Judicial Court (“SJC”) upheld the trial court’s decision, provid-
ing both common law and statutory justifications for its decision.7 
Mindful that its ruling represented a fundamental shift in foreclosure 
requirements in Massachusetts, the court applied its holding only pro-
spectively, as retroactive application could have clouded title on 
countless previously foreclosed-upon properties.8 Although the ruling 
could have a far-ranging effect on foreclosure practice in Massachu-
setts, the court missed an opportunity to use the Uniform Commer-
cial Code (UCC) to provide clarity and predictability to this area of 
the law.9 Instead, to reach its conclusion, the opinion followed a ra-
ther circuitous path through nineteenth-century common law and 
around the UCC.10 
 Part I of this Comment provides an overview of mortgage law in 
Massachusetts and reviews the facts of the case.11 Part II then explains 
how the court in Eaton relied on nineteenth-century common law to 
inform its interpretation of relevant foreclosure statutes.12 Finally, Part 
                                                                                                                      
2 See Mass. Foreclosure Activity Continues to Climb in March, Warren Group (Apr. 26. 2012), 
http://www.thewarrengroup.com/2012/04/mass-foreclosure-activity-continues-to-climb-in- 
march/ (showing that Massachusetts foreclosure filings were 71.5% greater in the first quar-
ter of 2012 than the same time in 2011). 
3 See Press Release, Patton Boggs LLP, MBS Actions Drive Mortgage Litigation Index to 
Record High ( Jan. 9, 2012), available at http://www.pattonboggs.com/media/detail.aspx? 
news=1639 (showing the highest levels of mortgage-related litigation since tracking began 
in 2007). 
4 Eaton v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, 969 N.E.2d 1118, 1122–23 (Mass. 2012). 
5 Id. at 1123. A “note” is the document laying out the terms of a loan, whereas a “mort-
gage” is the document that secures the loan with property. See infra notes 19–22 and accom-
panying text (discussing these two terms more thoroughly). 
6 Eaton, 969 N.E.2d at 1132–33. 
7 Id. at 1121, 1124; see infra note 28 (describing Fannie Mae). 
8 Eaton, 969 N.E.2d at 1121, 1124. 
9 See id. at 1131 & n.26. 
10 See id. at 1124–31. 
11 See infra notes 15–57 and accompanying text. 
12 See infra notes 58–87 and accompanying text. 
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III notes the near-absence of the UCC from the Eaton decision and con-
siders the interplay between the UCC and mortgage law in Massachu-
setts.13 Further, Part III  argues that courts should give the UCC a more 
prominent role in governing mortgages, as doing so would increase 
clarity and predictability for lenders, homeowners, and lawyers.14 
I. Mortgage Law, Past and Present 
A. The Traditional Mortgage and Foreclosure 
 A mortgage is the means by which a debt is secured by real proper-
ty.15 Its roots in the Anglo-American legal tradition date back nearly a 
millennium.16 In medieval times, the security took the form of a condi-
tional conveyance; the borrower would grant land to the lender, with 
title reverting to the borrower at a prescribed date only if the loan had 
been repaid.17 
 The mortgage’s historical origins as a creature of property law 
explain its modern form.18 A borrower and lender today will execute 
two separate documents if the loan is to be secured by real property: 
the note and the mortgage.19 The note describes the loan and the 
terms of repayment, whereas the mortgage secures the debt by grant-
ing the lender (or the mortgagee) an interest in the property of the 
borrower (or the mortgagor). 20  Upon payment of the underlying 
                                                                                                                      
13 See infra notes 88–106 and accompanying text. 
14 See infra notes 88–106 and accompanying text. 
15 Black’s Law Dictionary 1101 (9th ed. 2009). 
16 See 4 Thomas E. Atkinson et al., American Law of Property 3 (A. James Casner, 
ed., 1952). 
17 Id. at 3–5. This system continued with only minor variations until the courts of equi-
ty intervened in the early twelfth century. See id. at 3–18 (tracing the mortgage from the 
twelfth century forward). Finding the absolute forfeiture of land suffered by a delinquent 
mortgagor unfair, the courts of equity created the right of redemption, giving the mort-
gagor a certain period of time, determined by the court, to pay the loan and retain the 
property. See id. at 17–18. Foreclosure is the mortgagee’s action at the end of that period; 
the mortgagee literally “forecloses” on the mortgagor’s right of redemption. Id. at 27. 
18 Restatement (Third) of Prop.: Mortgs. § 1.1 (1997). 
19 Id. This is different from a standard secured consumer transaction (such as an au-
tomobile loan), where one document lists both the terms of the loan and collateral. See id. 
20 Eaton, 969 N.E.2d at 1124. Because mortgages are governed by state law, the law varies 
across state lines. Ann M. Burkhart, Real Estate Practice in the Twenty-First Century, 72 Mo. L. 
Rev. 1031, 1035–36 (2007). In Massachusetts. the interest given to the mortgagee is legal title. 
Eaton, 969 N.E.2d at 1124 (noting that Massachusetts is a “title theory” state). Other states, 
however, subscribe to a “lien theory” of mortgages, where the mortgage merely creates a 
nonpossessory interest in the subject property. Restatement (Third) of Prop.: Mortgs. 
§ 4.1 (1997) (“At least 32 states follow the ‘lien’ theory of mortgage law.”). 
102 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 54: E. Supp. 
debt, title is restored to the mortgagor.21 Although it is a discrete in-
strument, the mortgage is conceptually bound to the note.22 
 Should the mortgagor fall behind on payments, foreclosure is the 
process by which the mortgagee terminates the mortgagor’s interest 
in the property.23 Massachusetts foreclosures are governed by statute 
and by the text of the mortgage itself; they do not require judicial 
oversight.24 The most expedient method of foreclosure is by “power of 
sale.”25 Here, the mortgagee and mortgagor write into the mortgage 
that, under certain circumstances, the mortgagee may sell the proper-
ty at public auction and apply the proceeds to the mortgagor’s under-
lying debt.26 
                                                                                                                      
21 Eaton, 969 N.E.2d at 1124. 
22 Id. The Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) has referred to the separated mortgage as “a 
mere technical interest,” meaning it afforded few rights to the holder at common law. See 
id. at 1125 (quoting Wolcott v. Winchester, 81 Mass. (15 Gray) 461, 465 (1860)); infra notes 
61–64 and accompanying text. 
23 See Arthur L. Eno, Jr. et al., 28 Mass. Prac., Real Estate Law § 10.1 (4th ed. 
2004). 
24 See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 183, § 21 (2010). In other states, foreclosures need judicial 
approval. Restatement (Third) of Prop: Mortgs. § 3.4 (1997) (“[In] about half of the 
jurisdictions in the nation . . . a judicial proceeding is the only method of mortgage foreclo-
sure.”). But there is one caveat: although Massachusetts foreclosures are non-judicial, the 
foreclosing party must undertake a short proceeding in the Land Court to determine that 
the mortgagor is not protected by the Servicemember’s Civil Relief Act. See Act of Mar. 4, 
1943, 1943 Mass. Acts 50 (as amended by Act of May 29, 1998, 1998 Mass. Acts 263) (enacting 
the requirements of the federal Servicemember’s Act); Eaton, 969 N.E.2d at 1127 n.14 (not-
ing that Land Court Servicemember’s proceedings are “limited” and not directly part of 
foreclosure proceedings). Interestingly, in January 2013, in HSBC Bank v. Matt, the SJC ruled 
that foreclosing parties must affirmatively establish standing in Servicemember’s proceed-
ings, meaning they must show possession of note and mortgage prior to foreclosure, not just 
when challenged afterwards. See HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Matt, 981 N.E.2d 710, 720–21 
(Mass. 2013); Rich Vetstein, Breaking: Massachusetts SJC Issues Another Important Foreclosure Rul-
ing in HSBC Bank v. Matt, Mass. Real Est. L. Blog ( Jan. 14, 2013), http://www. 
massrealestatelawblog.com/2013/01/14/massachusetts-sjc-issues-another-landmark-
foreclosure-ruling-in- 
hsbc-bank-v-matt/ (opining that this makes Massachusetts ”somewhat closer to a judicial 
foreclosure state than a non-judicial foreclosure state”). 
25 Eaton, 969 N.E.2d at 1127 n.16. 
26 Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 183, § 21; id. ch. 244, § 11. The triggering circumstance for 
exercise of the power is generally delinquency on loan payments, as was the case in Eaton. 
See Eaton, 969 N.E.2d at 1122. The alternative to foreclosure by power of sale in Massachu-
setts is foreclosure “by entry,” where the mortgagee must peaceably enter the property 
(evicting the mortgagor) and possess it for three years. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 244, §§ 1–2; 
see U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d 40, 49 n.15 (Mass. 2011). The speedier fore-
closure by power of sale has largely eclipsed foreclosure by entry (although mortgagees 
may pursue both methods simultaneously). See Eaton, 969 N.E.2d at 1127 n.15; Ibanez, 941 
N.E.2d at 49 n.15. 
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B. Securitization Leads to Foreclosure Problems 
 Whereas traditionally the note and mortgage were both physical 
papers held by a single mortgagee, this arrangement began to break 
down in the late twentieth century as a result of securitization.27 In 
securitizing a mortgage, an entity—such as the Federal National 
Mortgage Association (“Fannie Mae”) or an investment bank—buys 
mortgages from their originating lenders, pools them together, and 
issues securities to sell to investors.28 The scope and complexity of se-
curitization, however, led to many errors.29 Mortgages, as property 
interests, are generally subject to recording laws when transferred (or 
“assigned”).30 Notes, conversely, face no such statutory requirement 
and can be transferred more liberally.31 As financial institutions bun-
dled and transferred huge numbers of mortgages, records were lost 
and some legal requirements (some so basic as signatures) were by-
passed.32 The widespread use of the Mortgage Electronic Registration 
System (“MERS”), a secondary mortgage trading market, to sidestep 
recording requirements presented further difficulties.33 
                                                                                                                      
27 See Kurt Eggert, The Great Collapse: How Securitization Caused the Subprime Meltdown, 41 
Conn. L. Rev. 1257, 1266 (2009). 
28 Id. Not only is ownership of the mortgage transferred (often multiple times), but par-
tial interests in the mortgage may be sold, further increasing the complexity of the system. Id. 
The Federal National Mortgage Association, commonly known as ”Fannie Mae,” is a govern-
ment-sponsored institution that purchases mortgages from other lenders, allowing those 
lenders to have sufficient funding to give out further mortgages. Who Is Fannie Mae Today?, 
Fannie Mae, http://www.fanniemae.com/portal/about-us/company-overview/about-fm.html 
(last visited Mar. 20, 2013). 
29 See Alan M. White, Losing the Paper—Mortgage Assignments, Note Transfers and Consumer 
Protection, 24 Loy. Consumer L. Rev. 468, 469 (2012). For example, many entities began to 
use “robo-signing” to streamline their securitization work. Id. at 469–70. The practice of 
“robo-signing” became notorious and has been described as “assembly-line signing and nota-
rizing of affidavits for foreclosure cases, mortgage assignments, note allonges and related 
documents.” Id.; see also Caitlin M. Mulligan, Note, From AAA to F: How the Credit Rating Agen-
cies Failed America and What Can Be Done to Protect Investors, 50 B.C. L. Rev. 1275, 1288–90 
(2009) (noting the growing complexity of financial products and their contribution to the 
financial crisis). 
30 Christopher L. Peterson, Foreclosure, Subprime Mortgage Lending, and the Mortgage Elec-
tronic Registration System, 78 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1359, 1364–66 (2010) (providing a general over-
view of property recording in the United States). 
31 See Eaton, 969 N.E.2d at 1131. 
32 See White, supra note 29, at 469–70. 
33 Id. at 486. Members of MERS (generally banks) may assign mortgages to the MERS 
corporation, recording the assignment. See Phyllis K. Slesinger & Daniel McLaughlin, 
Mortgage Electronic Registration System, 31 Idaho L. Rev. 805, 806 (1995). They then enter 
the mortgages into the MERS computer database, wherein they may internally transfer a 
mortgage or any fractional interest to any other member without having to record exter-
nally. See id. at 807. Thus, although the note (and attendant right to collect payments) is 
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 As a result, when the housing market began to collapse in 2007 
and lenders attempted to foreclose, they encountered numerous dif-
ficulties producing the requisite documentation that showed owner-
ship of the note and mortgage.34 Individual mortgage loans had been 
sliced up, rebundled, and sold so many times that proving ownership 
was often impossible.35 Foreclosing parties frequently could locate the 
note but not the mortgage36 or—as was the case in Eaton—the mort-
gage but not the note.37 Depending on prevailing state law, these 
lapses could invalidate the foreclosures.38 
 In Massachusetts, however, foreclosures could proceed as long as 
the foreclosing party held the mortgage.39 Before the SJC decided 
Eaton, the common understanding among the bar and trial courts was 
that holding both the note and the mortgage was not necessary to 
foreclose.40 
                                                                                                                      
transferred to a new owner, MERS remains the holder of the mortgage in the registry of 
deeds. Peterson, supra note 30, at 1371 (“Once a loan is assigned to MERS, the public land 
title records no longer reveal who (or what) actually owns a lien on the property in ques-
tion.”). Instead of transferring title outright, a member may also simply designate MERS as 
“nominee”; in such cases, MERS is the mortgagee of record but the member retains legal 
title. See Slesinger & McLaughlin, supra, at 806–07. 
34 White, supra note 29, at 474–76 (providing examples of missing documentation). Such 
documentation is always necessary after the fact if the mortgagor challenges the foreclosure 
as improper in court—as occurred in Eaton—and may also be necessary before foreclosure in 
states requiring judicial foreclosure. See Eaton, 969 N.E.2d at 1123. 
35 See White, supra note 29, at 474–76. 
36 See Ibanez., 941 N.E.2d at 53–54 (rejecting the argument that plaintiff U.S. Bank’s 
foreclosure was validated by its holding the note alone). 
37 Eaton, 969 N.E.2d at 1122–23. 
38 White, supra note 29, at 476–83, 489–93 (surveying cases where the foreclosing party 
did not properly hold note or mortgage). 
39 See Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. McKenna, No. 11 MISC 447455, 2011 WL 6153419, at 
*2 n.1 (Mass. Land Ct. Dec. 8, 2011). In 2011, in Wells Fargo Bank v. McKenna, a Massachu-
setts Land Court judge stated that “[t]he correct view of prevailing Massachusetts law is 
. . . that our common law does not require, for an effective exercise of a mortgage’s pow-
er of sale, that the note for which the mortgage is security be at that time held by the 
mortgage holder.” Id. 
40 See, e.g., In re Marron, 455 B.R. 1, 7 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2011) (“Massachusetts law does 
not require a unity of ownership of a mortgage and its underlying note prior to foreclo-
sure.”); McKenna, 2011 WL 6153419, at *2 n.1 (holding that a mortgagee does not require 
the note to foreclose and predicting that the SJC will not require unity of note and mort-
gage); Adamson v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 28 Mass. L. Rptr. 153, 2011 WL 
1136462, at *4 (Mass. Super. Ct. Mar. 23, 2011) (“[T]he record mortgagee has the authori-
ty to foreclose under the Massachusetts statutory scheme even if it did not hold the 
Note.”). 
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C. Eaton’s Mortgage, Foreclosure, and Ensuing Litigation 
 In 2007, Henrietta Eaton executed a note with her lender, 
BankUnited, FSB, granting her a $145,000 loan to refinance her 
home. 41  As security for the loan, Eaton simultaneously executed a 
mortgage to MERS, Inc., acting as nominee for BankUnited.42  The 
mortgage was subsequently assigned to Green Tree Servicing, LLC 
(“Green Tree”).43 
 After Eaton fell behind on repaying the loan, Green Tree com-
menced foreclosure proceedings, which culminated in a foreclosure 
sale late in 2009.44 Green Tree was itself the highest bidder at the sale; 
it later assigned its rights to the winning bid to Fannie Mae.45 
 Eaton, however, remained in her home, compelling Fannie Mae 
to seek eviction via a summary process action in Boston Housing 
Court early in 2010.46 As a counterclaim, Eaton alleged that the fore-
closure was improper because although Green Tree (the foreclosing 
party) was in possession of the mortgage, it was not in possession of 
the corresponding note.47 Although BankUnited had indorsed the 
note in blank, its holder at the time of foreclosure was unknown.48 
Without a proper foreclosure, Green Tree’s transfer of ownership to 
Fannie Mae and Fannie Mae’s subsequent eviction case would both be 
invalid.49 The housing court judge allowed Eaton to seek relief in Su-
perior Court.50 There, the motion judge granted a preliminary in-
junction forbidding Fannie Mae from proceeding with its eviction ac-
                                                                                                                      
41 Eaton, 969 N.E.2d at 1121. 
42 Id. at 1121–22. 
43 Id. at 1122. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. at 1122–23. 
46 Id. 
47 Eaton, 969 N.E.2d at 1123. As discussed previously, this was a novel argument; common 
practice in Massachusetts was to require only the mortgage to foreclose. Id. at 1132; supra 
notes 39–40 and accompanying text. This argument had surfaced already in other states. See 
New Foreclosure Defense: Prove I Owe You, Associated Press, Feb. 17, 2009, available at http:// 
www.msnbc.msn.com/id/29242063/ns/business-real_estate/t/new-foreclosure-defense-prove- 
i-owe-you/#.UPciceQ0WSp (discussing mortgagors’ demands that foreclosing mortgagees 
show ownership of both note and mortgage in Florida and Ohio). 
48 Eaton, 969 N.E.2d at 1122–23. Indorsement is the signing of the back of a negotiable 
instrument to transfer it to another party; if the instrument is signed but no party is named 
it is “indorsed in blank” and is payable to the bearer. Black’s Law Dictionary 844 (9th 
ed. 2009). 
49 Eaton, 969 N.E.2d at 1120–21. 
50 Id. at 1123. At the time, the jurisdiction of the housing court to hear mortgage cases 
was not clear; it has since been confirmed by the SJC in 2011 in Bank of New York v. Bailey. 
951 N.E.2d 331, 336(Mass. 2011). 
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tion or otherwise interfering with Eaton’s property. 51  Fannie Mae 
made an interlocutory appeal to the Appeals Court, and the SJC took 
up the case on its own initiative.52 
 On appeal, Eaton’s briefs contained several alternative arguments, 
one of which was that the UCC dictated that the foreclosure was im-
proper.53 Eaton argued that under Article 3 of the UCC, which governs 
negotiable instruments, Green Tree was not entitled to enforce the 
note by commencing foreclosure.54 Section 3-301 lists three categories 
of entities that may enforce a note: (1) holders of the note; (2) non-
holders in possession of the note with rights of holders; and (3) former 
possessors of a note when a note has been dishonored, destroyed, lost, 
or stolen.55 Green Tree does not fall into any of the above categories, as 
it could not prove possession of the note at the time of foreclosure, and 
the note, produced later for the litigation, was clearly not dishonored, 
destroyed, lost, or stolen.56 Therefore, Eaton concluded, Green Tree’s 
enforcement of the note was improper.57 
II. The Supreme Judicial Court Prospectively Requires Unity 
of Note and Mortgage and the Massachusetts  
Legislature Follows Suit 
 In spite of being prominently featured in Eaton’s brief, the SJC in 
Eaton relegated the UCC to a footnote in the decision, stating that it 
“perceived nothing in the UCC inconsistent” with requiring the fore-
                                                                                                                      
51 Eaton, 969 N.E.2d at 1123. 
52 Id. 
53 Brief of Appellee at 6–9, Eaton, 969 N.E.2d 1118 (No. SJC-11041). Massachusetts, 
codifies the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) in chapter 106 of the Massachusetts Gen-
eral Laws, with the section numbering mirroring the original UCC. See Mass. Gen. Laws 
ch. 106 (2010). The Massachusetts codification does not differ from the official UCC in 
any way relevant to this Comment. See The Permanent Editorial Bd. for the UCC, Ap-
plication of the Uniform Commercial Code to Selected Issues Relating to Mort-
gage Notes 2 nn.6 & 8 (2011) [hereinafter PEB Report], available at http://www.uni- 
formlaws.org/Shared/Committees_Materials/PEBUCC/PEB_Report_111411.pdf (stating 
that interaction between the UCC and mortgage law is not affected by differing UCC en-
actments from state to state, except in New York). 
54 Brief of Appellee, supra note 53, at 21, 25. Eaton also made this argument in the 
lower court; although the lower court judge ruled on other grounds, she did mention the 
UCC in a footnote. See Eaton v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, No. SUCV201101382, 2011 WL 
6379284, at *4 n.5 (Mass. Super. Ct. June 17, 2011). 
55 See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 106, § 3-301. A note is dishonored when it “is paid or ac-
cepted by mistake and the payor or acceptor recovers payment or revokes acceptance.” Id. 
ch. 106, § 3-418. 
56 Brief of Appellee, supra note 53, at 25. 
57 Id. 
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closing party to hold the note.58 Instead, the court focused on the sec-
tions of the Massachusetts General Laws dealing with foreclosure: 
chapters 183 and 244.59 
 The court, however, did not start with the statutory text; it first 
reviewed common law, reasoning that the statutes’ broader legal con-
text would aid its interpretation.60 Reviewing several cases from the 
nineteenth century, the court noted that although mortgages have 
always served as both security for debt and transfer of legal title, the 
note’s security interest must be primary.61 The court also observed 
that separating the note and mortgage is technically possible but 
highly impractical.62 Thus, if separated from the note it secures, the 
mortgage “has no value as property” and, at best, is held “as a trust for 
the benefit of the holder of the note.”63 Given the inefficacy of a sepa-
rated mortgage, the court concluded that both note and mortgage 
would be necessary to conduct a foreclosure properly at common 
law.64 
 Against that backdrop, the court concluded that the provisions of 
the Massachusetts General Laws that govern foreclosure require unity 
of note and mortgage.65 The key to the court’s decision was its inter-
pretation of the meaning of “mortgagee.”66 Some sections of the Mas-
sachusetts General Laws use the term without reference to the note or 
underlying debt67 (and Fannie Mae argued this supported its asser-
                                                                                                                      
58 Eaton v. Fed. Nat. Mortg. Ass’n, 969 N.E.2d 1118, 1126–27,  1131 n.26 (Mass. 2012); 
see Brief of Appellee, supra note 53, at 21–25. Although the court’s statement is technically 
true, it appears that the foreclosing party must satisfy the requirements of both foreclosure 
statutes and the UCC. See PEB Report, supra note 53, at 14. 
59 See Eaton, 969 N.E.2d at 1126–27, 1129. 
60 Id. at 1124, 1129. 
61 Id. at 1124, 1129–30. 
62 See id. at 1125–26 (quoting Sanger v. Bancroft, 78 Mass. (12 Gray) 365, 367 (1859)). 
63 Id. at 1125–26. In Massachusetts, the mortgage does not automatically follow the note, 
as it does in some other states. Id. at 1124. This understanding seemingly reflects a time when 
both note and mortgage existed only in their original, paper form, and therefore could be 
separated physically—indeed, the court cites numerous cases from the 1800s. See id. at 1124 
(citing Barnes v. Boardman, 21 N.E. 308 (Mass. 1889), Morris v. Bacon, 123 Mass. 58 (1877), 
and Wolcott v. Winchester, 81 Mass. (15 Gray) 461 (1860)). 
64 Eaton, 969 N.E.2d at 1125. 
65 Id. at 1129. 
66 See id at 1129–30. 
67 See id. at 1127–28. For example, Massachusetts General Laws chapter 183, § 21, 
which introduces foreclosure by power of sale, allows the mortgagee to sell the mortgaged 
property as long as it complies “with the terms of the mortgage and with the statutes relat-
ing to the foreclosure of mortgages by the exercise of a power of sale.” Mass. Gen. Laws 
ch. 183, § 21 (2010). In a similar vein, chapter 244, section 14 allows “[t]he mortgagee 
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tion that only a mortgage is required to foreclose).68 The court, how-
ever, found these sections ambiguous.69 To rectify this ambiguity, the 
court looked to other sections that use “mortgagee” in connection 
with the note and the underlying debt.70 For example, Massachusetts 
General Laws chapter 244, section 17B, which discusses the notice 
required to seek deficiency judgments after foreclosure, seems to use 
“mortgagee” interchangeably with “holder of a mortgage note.”71 
 Accordingly, after examining the statutory scheme, the court 
concluded that the legislature must have intended the mortgage-
holder and note-holder to be the same person, for two reasons.72 First, 
all of the sections discussing the note involve payment to the holder 
of the mortgage, a nonsensical result if the mortgage-holder is not the 
holder of the debt as well.73 Second, this interpretation is consistent 
with the court’s reading of common law.74 Thus, the court held that, 
to have properly foreclosed on Eaton’s property, the defendants must 
have held the note or acted as agent of the note-holder.75 
 Because the court’s conclusion signified a major change in Mas-
sachusetts mortgage law, the court took the unusual step of applying 
its ruling only prospectively.76 When interpreting statutes, courts do 
not claim to be making new law; rather they are “finding” the law that 
has been there all along.77 Thus, holdings are typically applied retro-
actively.78 In Eaton, however, if applied in the standard, retroactive 
manner, the court’s holding could potentially have rendered invalid 
countless foreclosures stretching decades into the past.79 Real estate 
                                                                                                                      
. . . upon breach of condition and without action, [to] do all the acts authorized or re-
quired by the power [of sale] . . . .” Id. ch. 244, § 14. 
68 Eaton, 969 N.E.2d at 1127–28. 
69 Id. at 1128. 
70 See id. at 1128–29. 
71 Id. at 1128; see Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 244, § 17B. Additionally, chapter 244, section 
19 states that one paying to redeem mortgaged property should pay the mortgagee, sec-
tion 20 mandates that a mortgagee in possession of the mortgaged property deduct rents 
and profits from the amount due on the mortgage, and section 23 allows a court to order 
the amount due to be paid to the mortgagee. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 244, §§ 19, 20, 23. 
72 Eaton, 969 N.E.2d at 1128–29. 
73 See id. 
74 Id. at 1129. 
75 Id. at 1131, 1134. The court vacated the injunction and remanded the case to de-
termine whether Green Tree was authorized by the note-holder, as that issue was not raised 
in the lower courts. Id. at 1134. 
76 See id. at 1133. 
77 Id. at 1132. 
78 See Eaton, 969 N.E.2d at 1132. 
79 See id. at 1131. 
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transactions would have been frozen in Massachusetts as prospective 
sellers found their titles clouded, and untangling the mess would have 
taken years.80 Wary of such a result, the court held that its ruling 
would affect only foreclosures commenced after the date of the deci-
sion: June 22, 2012.81 
 Shortly after Eaton, the Massachusetts legislature acted to codify 
some of the elements of the decision.82 On August 3, 2012, Governor 
Deval Patrick signed into law “An Act Preventing Unlawful and Un-
necessary Foreclosures.”83 The bill contained a number of provisions 
designed to aid both struggling homeowners and subsequent bona 
fide purchasers of foreclosed-upon properties.84 Among these provi-
sions were several elements of the Eaton decision.85 For example, an 
entity may not commence foreclosure if it “knows or should know” 
that the mortgagee does not hold the note or act as the note-holder’s 
agent.86 The law also adopted the court’s suggestion in Eaton that uni-
ty of note and mortgage be averred in affidavit form.87 
                                                                                                                      
80 See Brief of the Am. Land Title Ass’n, Amicus Curiae at 1, Eaton, 969 N.E.2d 1118 
(No. SJC-11041) (arguing that retrospective application would create chaos); Amicus Curi-
ae Brief of the Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency at 3, Eaton, 969 N.E.2d 1118 (No. SJC-11041) 
(same); Brief of the Real Estate Bar Ass’n for Mass. & the Abstract Club Amici Curiae at 5–
6, Eaton, 969 N.E.2d 1118 (No. SJC-11041) (same). 
81 Eaton, 969 N.E.2d at 1133. More specifically, the ruling applied to foreclosures with 
mandatory notices of sale given after that date. Id. 
82 See An Act Preventing Unlawful and Unnecessary Foreclosures, ch. 194, 2012 Mass. 
Acts § 2. 
83 Press Release, Office of Gov. Deval Patrick, Gov. Patrick Signs Foreclosure Preven-
tion Law to Expand Prots. for Homeowners (Aug. 3, 2012), available at http://www.mass. 
gov/governor/pressoffice/pressreleases/2012/2012803-governor-patrick-signs-foreclosure-prevention- 
law.html. 
84 See 2012 Mass. Acts § 2. The bill’s most dramatic measure is a requirement that all 
lenders take steps to avoid foreclosure. Id. (“A creditor shall not cause publication of no-
tice of a foreclosure sale . . . unless it has first taken reasonable steps and made a good 
faith effort to avoid foreclosure.”). Lenders gain the benefit of a presumption of compli-
ance if they explore loan modification. Id. (granting a presumption of compliance if a 
creditor determines a borrower’s ability to pay, devises a modified payment plan, conducts 
a cost-benefit analysis comparing the modified plan to foreclosure, and either offers the 
modified plan to the borrower or furnishes reasons for rejection). Additionally, the new 
law requires that all mortgage assignments be recorded. Id. § 1 (“[N]o notice . . . shall be 
valid unless . . . an assignment, or a chain of assignments, evidencing the assignment of 
the mortgage to the foreclosing mortgagee has been duly recorded . . . .”). The SJC sug-
gested this as a best practice in 2011 in U.S. Bank National Association v. Ibanez. 941 N.E.2d 
40, 53 (Mass. 2011). It does not appear to have any effect on the legality of MERS, as long 
as assignments to MERS are properly recorded. See supra note 33 (explaining MERS). 
85 See 2012 Mass. Acts § 2; Eaton, 969 N.E.2d at 1129–31, 1133 n.28. 
86 Id. (“[A] creditor shall not cause publication of notice of foreclosure . . . when the 
creditor knows or should know that the mortgagee is neither the holder of the mortgage 
note nor the authorized agent of the note holder.”). Although the facts of Eaton concern a 
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III. The Supreme Judicial Court’s Silence on the Uniform 
Commercial Code: A Missed Opportunity  
to Provide Clarity 
 Instead of wending its way through nineteenth-century common 
law and struggling with statutory interpretation in Eaton, the SJC 
should have turned to the UCC.88 As Henrietta Eaton argued in her 
brief, Article 3 of the UCC would have mandated that Green Tree be 
entitled to enforce the note before it could foreclose, and without the 
note Green Tree could not prove it was so entitled.89 Thus, the UCC 
could have compelled a ruling for Eaton in a more simple and 
straightforward manner.90 
 Although the outcome of the case may be in accord with the 
UCC, the court’s failure to address the UCC obfuscates the relation-
ship between the UCC and foreclosures in Massachusetts.91 In fact, 
Eaton is not the first time the SJC has neglected the UCC in a mort-
gage context.92 At least one commentator has tried to explain the 
                                                                                                                      
residential mortgage, the holding does not explicitly confine itself to those terms. See Eaton, 
969 N.E.2d at 1131. Conversely, the new bill’s requirement of unity of note and mortgage 
applies only to residential mortgages. 2012 Mass. Acts § 2 (defining “mortgage loan” as those 
loans secured by “residential property”). 
87 2012 Mass. Acts § 2 (mandating that creditors certify compliance via an affidavit 
recorded at the registry of deeds); see Eaton, 969 N.E.2d at 1133 n.28. 
88 See infra notes 89–106 and accompanying text. 
89 See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 106, § 3-301 (2010) (delineating who may enforce a nego-
tiable instrument); see also supra notes 52–57 and accompanying text (explaining Green 
Tree’s inability to enforce the note under UCC Article 3). As a cautionary note, however, 
UCC Article 3 applies only to negotiable instruments, and mortgage notes may not always 
qualify as negotiable instruments. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 106, § 3-104; PEB Report, 
supra note 53, at 4 n.13 (noting that the question of negotiability of mortgage notes is an 
open one). The court in Eaton did not address the issue. See Eaton v. Fed. Nat. Mortg. 
Ass’n, 969 N.E.2d 1118, 1121–23 (Mass. 2012). 
90 See PEB Report, supra note 53, at 14 (arguing that legal determinations made under 
the UCC are often “central” to the outcome of foreclosure cases). UCC Article 9 also could 
have been relevant to this case. See id. at 12. If a note is sold and the associated mortgage is 
not also transferred, UCC § 9-203(g) explicitly provides that the interest in the mortgage 
follows the note. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 106, § 9-203(g); PEB Report, supra note 53, at 12. 
This is a default rule, however, and if the parties agree to separate the note and mortgage, 
the UCC appears to permit it. See PEB Report, supra note 53, at 12 n.44. The facts of Eaton 
seem to suggest that this was the case, as the documents explicitly send the note to 
BankUnited and the mortgage to MERS. See Eaton, 969 N.E.2d at 1121–22. If so, Article 9 
would not control. See PEB Report, supra note 53, at 12 n.44. 
91 See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 106, § 3-301; PEB Report, supra note 53, at 4. 
92 See U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d 40, 53–54 (Mass. 2011). In 2011, in 
U.S. Bank National Association v. Ibanez, the SJC, without mentioning the UCC, held that a 
note-holder also needed to hold the mortgage for foreclosure to be proper; the note alone 
was insufficient. Id. This contradicts UCC Article 9’s mandate that, absent evidence to the 
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court’s failure to address the UCC by emphasizing the separateness of 
property law (which governs foreclosure) and contract law (which 
governs commercial notes).93 Under this view, the UCC merely con-
templates transferring a security interest in the mortgage loan, not 
the property interest in the mortgage itself.94 Foreclosure, conversely, 
is the domain of property law.95 This argument is accurate as to the 
history of the law but ignores current reality: property law and the 
UCC’s commercial law may have developed independently, but today 
they undoubtedly intersect.96 Centuries-old property concepts are ill-
suited to governing the modern, paperless mortgage world.97 This 
historical baggage, however, continues to burden courts today.98 The 
SJC has come halfway, recognizing that the property interest of the 
mortgage is merely a vestigial structure left over from the time when a 
mortgage truly transferred title.99 The court, however, has yet to take 
the next step and update the common law to better reflect the reali-
ties of the modern mortgage market by integrating the UCC into the 
analysis.100 
 Addressing the UCC in mortgage and foreclosure contexts would 
be a big step toward bringing the law into the present day.101 Whereas 
Massachusetts property law remains saddled with ancient concepts of 
questionable utility, the commercial law governing mortgage notes has 
evolved to embrace modern commercial practices such as electronic 
                                                                                                                      
contrary, the mortgage follows the note—that is, the note-holder presumably also holds 
the mortgage, even absent independent documentation. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 106, § 9-
203(g); supra note 90 (discussing UCC Article 9). 
93 See Recent Case, U.S. Bank National Ass'n v. Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d 40 (Mass. 2011), 125 
Harv. L. Rev. 827, 833 (2012). 
94 See id. at 832–33. 
95 See id. 
96 See White, supra note 29, at 470. 
97 See id. at 471–76 (examining the application of UCC Article 3 in the context of 
modern mortgage note transfers). 
98 See Eaton, 969 N.E.2d at 1124–26. Such baggage includes not only the separation of 
note and mortgage and constructive trust theories discussed in Eaton, but also title theory 
mortgages in general. See id. The Restatement notes that contemporary title theory differs 
little from lien theory and adopts the lien theory, both to promote uniformity and also to 
avoid the title theory’s conceptual tensions. Restatement (Third) of Prop.: Mortgs. 
§ 4.1 (1997) (“It makes little sense to perpetuate in the modern real estate financing envi-
ronment a title concept that arose in large measure as a result of now obsolete English 
usury law.”). 
99 See Eaton, 969 N.E.2d at 1124–25. 
100 See id. at 1131 n.26.  
101 See id. 
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trading and securitization.102 Any similar attempt to modernize mort-
gage law, synthesize it with commercial law, and uniformly apply it 
across all states should be welcomed by homeowners, lenders, and legal 
practitioners alike.103 The UCC would be a valuable tool toward this 
end—indeed, the stated purpose of the UCC is to “simplify, clarify and 
modernize” commercial law and render it uniform across jurisdic-
tions.104 Other state courts have not hesitated to invoke the UCC in de-
ciding foreclosure cases; Massachusetts should follow suit.105  In the 
meantime, other state courts confronting foreclosure cases should turn 
to the UCC first, as doing so may swiftly determine the outcome.106 
Conclusion 
 In Eaton, the SJC interpreted Massachusetts foreclosure statutes 
against the backdrop of centuries-old common law, concluding that 
foreclosure required unity of note and mortgage. This represented a 
major shift in foreclosure requirements, compelling the court to ap-
ply its ruling only prospectively. The decision, however, offers no 
analysis or application of the UCC, which could have compelled the 
same result. By omitting any such discussion, the court left the rela-
tionship between the UCC and mortgage law in Massachusetts un-
clear. Although the SJC may not reverse course soon, other courts fac-
ing this issue should apply the UCC. Doing so should bring much-
                                                                                                                      
102 See Restatement (Third) of Prop.: Mortgs. § 4.1 (1997); see also Amelia H. Boss, 
The Evolution of Commercial Law Norms: Lessons to Be Learned from Electronic Commerce, 34 
Brook. J. Int’l L. 673, 673–75 (2009) (providing a non-UCC example of commercial law 
moving towards uniformity). For example, many states have codified the Uniform Elec-
tronic Transaction Act to govern electronic transactions, records, and signatures. See, e.g., 
Cal. Civ. Code § 1633.1 et seq. (West 2012); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 110G (2010). 
103 See PEB Report, supra note 53, at 1 (noting confusion and inconsistency among 
judges and attorneys in applying the UCC to foreclosure cases); cf. Gregory M. Shaw, Note, 
Security Interests in Notes and Mortgages: Determining the Applicable Law, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 
1414, 1414–15 (1979) (arguing that applying UCC Article 9 to mortgages will increase 
clarity and consistency). 
104 Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 106, § 1-102 (2010). 
105 See Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co. v. Mitchell, 27 A.3d 1229, 1235 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 2011) (applying UCC Article 3 to conclude that the plaintiff did not have the 
right to enforce a note via foreclosure); Leyva v. Nat’l Default Servicing Corp., 255 P.3d 
1275, 1279–81 (Nev. 2011) (applying UCC Article 3 to determine if a lender had the right 
to foreclose). But see Shephard v. Am. Home Mortg. Servs., Inc., No. Civ. 2:09-1916 WBS 
GGH, 2009 WL 4505925, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2009) (holding that UCC Article 3 does 
not apply to non-judicial foreclosures). 
106 See PEB Report, supra note 53, at 14 (“[P]roper application of real property law re-
quires proper application of the UCC rules . . . .”). 
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